The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act - Critique and Commentary by Dakin, Melvin G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 4
June 1965
The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure
Act - Critique and Commentary
Melvin G. Dakin
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Melvin G. Dakin, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act - Critique and Commentary, 25 La. L. Rev. (1965)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol25/iss4/3
LO UISIANA VOLUME XXV
JUNE, 1965
LAW REVIEW NUMBER 4
THE REVISED MODEL STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT-CRITIQUE AND COMMENTARY
Melvin G. Dakin*
In November of last year, a Joint Legislative Committee was
appointed by the Governor of Louisiana and charged with pre-
paring uniform rules of administrative procedure for Louisiana
state agencies performing adjudicative and rule-making func-
tions. In an initial news release from the committee, it was
noted that "there are over fifty Louisiana state agencies that
hold administrative proceedings or hearings and . . . many of
these agencies do not have any written rules of procedure." The
committee, it was said, would "attempt to formulate its pro-
posed administrative procedure act from a combination of the
better and more workable rules of procedure now in effect in
various agencies in the Federal government, Louisiana, and
other states which have adopted uniform administrative pro-
cedure acts."'
The problem is thus seen in its two major aspects: the diver-
sity of those agency procedures which have already been brought
under complete statutory control, and the partial or complete
absence of statutory procedures in other agencies, which for
some reason, often inadvertence, have escaped the attention of
the legislature. Attempts to remedy present deficiencies could
take the form of agency by agency study and amendment of
governing statutes with corrective procedures, wherever the
need exists. This method might be more likely to meet the
specific needs of each agency, but it would obviously involve
extensive study and piecemeal legislation which could be many
years coming to full fruition. The shorter range solution is the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Reporter to the Joint Com-
mittee on the Formulation of Rules of Administrative Procedure.
1. Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Tuesday, November 17, 1964, p. 1-C, col. 1.
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one which the committee has announced its determination to
follow, namely, the preparation of a procedure act which will
apply to all agencies not specifically excepted and which will
consist of a formulation of procedural safeguards in agency
rule-making and adjudication. While imposing more than mini-
mal limitations, it will presumably be broadly enough conceived
so as not seriously to hamper performance of agency duties in
the process of assuring fair and meaningful participation by
affected parties.
It has now been more than twenty-five years since serious
drafting began on state and federal model administrative pro-
cedure acts,2 and the model addressed particularly to the prob-
lems of the states is already in its first revision. 3 Louisiana
comes relatively late to the enterprise of preparing a general
agency procedure act but consequently has the benefit of much
legislative experience elsewhere, as well as the benefit of a great
deal of scholarship on the problems of procedure in administra-
tive agencies, or on what has been apprehensively dubbed the
"headless fourth branch" of government. 4
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the present Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act as prepared by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1961,5 to note modifications which have been deemed neces-
sary from the original model of 1946,6 and particularly to note
modifications and criticisms presented by scholars and the legis-
lative committees of sister states.7 The National Commissioners
have stated that, in formulating the model, their concern has
been to assure: (1) that in rule-making all interested parties
will have notice and an opportunity to submit information and
views; (2) that there will be proper publicity for rules made;
(3) that there will be an opportunity to obtain advance deter-
2. See 1 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04 (1958) for historical
summary.
3. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 206 (1961) ; 90 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. - Revised Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 113-136 (Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Revised
Model Act].
4. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH
SPECIAL STUDIES 39-40 (1937).
5. Revised Model Act 113-136.
6. 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. - MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
174 (1957) ; I-lANDOOI OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 202 (1946).
7. The 1946 model was subjected to extensive criticism and comparison in a
Symposium, 33 IOWA L. REV. 196-375 (1948).
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mination of the validity and applicability of rules made; (4) that
there will be assurance of fundamental fairness in administra-
tive adjudications; (5) that there will be personal familiarity
with he evidence on the part of deciding officials; and (6)
that there will be review of adequate scope to assure correction
of administrative errors.8 Some or all of these objectives are
achieved in the operation of certain administrative agencies in
Louisiana; however, there are obviously many other agencies
having an important impact on the economic and social welfare
of the citizenry which, in some of their procedures, fall short of
the mark. It is this latter circumstance, of course, which has
prompted the concern of the legislature of Louisiana.
THE REVISED MODEL ACT OF 19619
Definitions
As is usual in present-day drafting practice, the revised
model act includes an initial section devoted to definitions. In
the earlier 1946 version, it was thought necessary to include
definitions of only three terms: "agency," "rule," and "con-
tested case"; to these have now been added "license," "licens-
ing," "person," and "party." The reasons for these additions are
discussed below.
"Agency"
Absent special constitutional provisions for some agencies,
an act which provides satisfactory procedures for rule-making
and adjudication could, of course, be made applicable to all
agencies; specific statutes could be left operative to provide
additional procedures deemed necessary because of the nature
of the agencies. Since the model is primarily concerned with
fundamentals, little conflict would probably result from this
approach. Thus, "agency" could be defined, as in the model,
to mean "each state board, commission, department or officer,
other than the legislature or the courts, authorized by law to
make rules or to determine contested cases." 10 Even with some
agencies specifically provided for in the Constitution and special
statutes, such an approach might be utilized, saving the task of
excepting designated agencies for specific provisions later in
8. Revised Model Act 118.
9. Id. at 119.
10. Id. at § 10.
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the statute. Such an approach would have, in its favor, the con-
centration of all exceptions from the act in one section, or at
least in one part of the act. It would seem to work satisfactorily
for Louisiana.
"Rule and Rule-making"
The revised model act next proceeds to define "contested
case",1 1 although symmetry might seem to favor defining "rule"
and "rule-making" first. The model also would seem deficient
in not defining "rule-making," so as to distinguish it from
adjudication or "contested case" procedure. Furthermore, it
would seem useful to provide, as Wisconsin has,'12 for specifically
excluding ad hoc rule-making from the formal rule-making pro-
cess, so as to avoid later arguments over the applicability of
certain procedures to participation and publication require-
ments. If the federal definition of "rule" were combined with
that of "rule-making,"1 3 and if the definition of "rule" were
expanded so as to specifically exclude ad hoc rule-making, it
would appear as follows:
"Rule" means each agency statement of general applica-
bility and future effect that implements, interprets or pre-
scribes substantive law or policy, or prescribes the procedure
or practice requirements of the agency. The term includes the
amendment or repeal of a prior rule but does not include (A)
statements concerning only the internal management of an
agency and not affecting private rights or procedures avail-
able to the public; (B) declaratory rulings or orders; or
(C) intra-agency memoranda. "Rule-making" means the
process employed by an agency for the formulation of a rule.
The fact that a statement of policy or an interpretation of a
statute is made in the decision of a case or in an agency
decision upon or disposition of a particular matter as applied
to a specific set of facts involved does not render the same
rule within this definition or constitute specific adoption
thereof by the agency so as to be required to be issued and
filed as provided in this subsection.
11. Revised Model Act § 1(2).
12. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.01(4) (1957).
13. Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, § 2(e) (1946), 5
U.S.C. § 1001 (c) (1946) [hereinafter referred to as Federal Act].
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"Order" and "Adjudication"
In the definition of "contested case," the model act has
used more abstract language than seems necessary, defining such
a case to mean "a proceeding . . . in which the legal rights,
duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be deter-
mined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing."'14 The
Federal Administrative Procedure Act 15 seems much more forth-
right and less likely to raise unnecessary questions, simply
defining "adjudication," or a "contested case," as the final dis-
position of any matter other than "rule-making." The need
for separately defining "license" and "licensing" could be elimi-
nated by specifically including non-revenue licensing in adjudica-
tion, where it should be. The task sought to be accomplished
in the model act in the definition of "contested case" would
seem more securely accomplished by substituting "adjudication"
for "contested case" and defining "order" and "adjudication"
as in the federal act, except for specifically including non-
revenue licensing. Thus:
"Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposi-
tion (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declara-
tory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rule-
making but including non-revenue licensing. "Adjudication"
means agency process for the formulation of an order.
"Person" and "Party"
The revised model act includes in its definitional section the
terms "person" and "party" specifically for the purpose of clari-
fying the limitations on ex parte consultations with decision-
making officers which are imposed in a later section of the act.'0
However, in adopting this method, it has used the term "person"
differently from the federal act 1 7 and so as to include, seemingly,
"employees" of the agency. As will be noted later, the objec-
tives thus sought to be obtained could be achieved directly with-
out resort to definitions at the outset.
14. Revised Model Act § 1(2).
15. Federal Act § 2(d).
16. Revised Model Act § 1(5) ; (6) ; § 13.
17. Federal Act § 5(c).
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Expansion of Rule-Making Procedures and
Notification Requirements
The revised model act devotes six sections to the rule-making
process,' 8 in many respects going substantially beyond the 1946
model act in imposing adherence to rigid procedures. For ex-
ample, it is suggested that the revised model act may go too
far in its sanction for insuring public information and that the
publication of each agency's procedural and substantive rules
could be assured by a simple statement of the requirement with-
out the threat of invalidation.' On the other hand, it can be
argued that procedures for notifying interested parties and
affording them an opportunity to participate in the rule-making
process are of such importance as to warrant the proposed sanc-
tion of invalidity unless prescribed procedures are followed.
20
But, at least, agency power to shorten the notice period in the
event of emergency rule-making seems required.
21
The new requirement of a statement from the agency setting
forth considerations for and against adoption of a rule seems
entirely warranted, but a specific recital of the reasons for
rejection of considerations urged by participants might well
prove unduly time-consuming. 22 Provision for an opportunity
to make application to the agency for rule-making action also
seems needed. However, provision for a time limit of thirty
days within which the agency must act may induce precipitate
18. Revised Model Act §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
19. Id. § 2(b) provides that "no agency rule, order, or decision is valid or
effective against any person or party, nor may it be invoked by the agency for
any purpose, until it has been made available for public inspection as herein
required. ... The sanction is softened somewhat by not being extended to per-
sons having actual knowledge of an unpublished rule.
20. Id. §3(a) and (c) provides that:
"Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule, the agency shall:
. . . give at least 20 days' notice of its intended action" and "afford all interested
persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in
writing." and that: "No rule hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in sub-
stantial compliance with this Section."
21. Id. § 3(b) provides that:
"If an agency finds that an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or
welfare requires adoption of a rule upon fewer than 20 days' notice and states
in writing its reasons for that finding, it may proceed without prior notice or
hearing or upon any abbreviated notice and hearing that it finds practicable, to
adopt an emergency rule. .. ."
22. Id. § 3(a) (2) provides that:
"... Upon adoption of a rule, the agency, if requested to do so by an inter-
ested person either prior to adoption or within 30 days thereafter, shall issue a
concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its adoption, incor-
porating therein its reasons for overruling the considerations urged against its
adoption."
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action which would not serve the public interest.23 It is sug-
gested that action within a reasonable time would impose suffi-
cient pressure on the agency to overcome inertia, if it exists.
Filing and Effectiveness of Rules
The revised model act carries forward substantially the same
provisions for the filing and exhibition of rules in the office
of the Secretary of State and requires that office to provide
a permanent register of rules open to the public. 24 However,
rules would now become effective twenty days after filing
instead of upon filing, unless there is reliance upon an emergency
provision for shortening the period in the event of "imminent
peril to the public health, safety, or welfare. '25 It is suggested
that additional safeguards might be provided for those persons
specifically entitled by law to receive copies of rules by adding
a third exception that for these persons rules shall become effec-
tive upon mailing.26
Compilations and Legislative Review of Rules
The revised model act contains a provision for charging the
Secretary of State with the duty of preparing and publishing
a compilation of the rules and regulations of all agencies cov-
ered by the act and with keeping such compilation current by
at least biennial supplements. 27 In addition, the Secretary would
be charged with publishing a monthly bulletin setting forth all
rules and regulations adopted during the preceding month.28 A
number of states have adopted provisions for publication of such
a compilation; New York, for example, has an elaborate loose-
leaf service published by the Department of State which rep-
resents substantial outlays for the state and for lawyers and
others subscribing to the service. 29 Whether a Secretary of
State's office or some other state office could be supplied with
23. Revised Model Act § 6 provides for such a petition with the further re-
quirement that: "Within 30 days after submission of a petition, the agency either
shall deny the petition in writing (stating its reasons for the denials) or shall
initiate rule making proceedings.
24. Id. § 4.
25. Ibid.
26. Such a provision has been incorporated in the Wisconsin act, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 227.026(4) (1957).
27. Revised Model Act § 5.
28. Ibid.
29. STATE OF NEW YoRK, OrnciA CoMPnLAToN Or COD-S, RuLEs AND
REruLATiOs (1964).
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sufficient funds and personnel to perform this substantial task
in Louisiana would seem a major issue; it seems doubtful that
it could be done privately without substantial state subsidy.
The revised model act does not suggest provisions for sup-
ervision of the rule-making process by the legislature or other-
wise, should this be deemed desirable. Various possibilities sug-
gest themselves, and a number of procedures are now in effect
in various states. The Wisconsin legislature, for example, has
what it has designated a Committee for Review of Administra-
not applicable to a partner who in return for services receives
tive Rules, consisting of two senators and two representativs. 88
The committee, however, is given advisory powers only; it is
charged simply with "the promotion of adequate and proper
rules by agencies and an understanding upon the part of the
public respecting such rules" and with making biennial recom-
mendations to the legislature and governor.1 The Oklahoma
legislature, on the other hand, has retained a veto power for
itself with respect to rule-making by providing that all rules
shall be filed with the legislature within ten days after their
adoption and that the legislature may, by joint resolution, dis-
approve of any rule so transmitted . 2 If disapproved, no attempt
may be made to re-promulgate the rule during the same legisla-
tive session; and failure to disapprove within thirty days of
transmittal or within the first thirty days of a subsequent legis-
lative session, which ever is the later, will result in approval of
the rule under the Oklahoma procedure.88
Adjudication Procedures
The provision in the revised model act which specifies the
procedure to be used in adjudication utilizes the term "contested
case" to describe the proceeding to which it is addressed and,
as we have noted, defines this term to mean "a proceeding ...
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are
required by law to be determined by an agency after an oppor-
tunity for hearing."8 4 The Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, on the other hand, simply defines adjudication as "agency
process for the formulation of an order" and order as "the whole
30. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.041 (1957).
31. Ibid.
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. 75, § 308 (1965).
'33. Ibid.
34. Revised Model Act § 1(2).
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or any part of the final disposition of any agency in any matter
other than rule-making but including licensing." 5 The reason
given for the language used in the revised model act is said to
be to make sure that rate-making is included in adjudication
rather than under rule-making as in the federal act.36 However,
since this was accomplished in the federal act with specific ex-
ceptions and inclusions,3 7 the federal terminology taken without
such exceptions and inclusions would seem entirely satisfactory
and would avoid the possibility of some proceeding being
omitted; in the federal act, if a proceeding is not rule-making,
it is necessarily adjudication. Since it is only for rule-making
that hearing requirements are relaxed, the full hearing require-
ments of "adjudication" will necessarily apply to all other pro-
ceedings unless specific exceptions are made. These require-
ments seem comprehensive enough for defining the scope of
notice to parties and the scope of participation afforded them
in hearing and settlement.3 8 However, it would seem that more
logical arrangement would be achieved, as well as clarity, if the
opportunity to conduct cross-examination were provided, along
with the opportunity to respond and present evidence.3 9 This
section, devoted as it is to adjudication procedure, would also
seem the appropriate place to provide specifically that all parties
shall have the right to appear by counsel if they choose, and for
such counsel to act for and on behalf of the party he represents.
It is not clear whether this omission from the model was delib-
erate or inadvertent, but in any event it seems obvious that a
legislature would desire to provide such right to the parties.40
As to the content of the record for adjudication, this section
35. Federal Act § 2 (d).
36. Revised Model Act § 1(2), Commissioners' Note.
37. In the Federal Act, the section devoted to adjudication specifically exempts
"proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices
of public utilities or carriers" from its requirements as to separating functions
of agency employees. Federal Act § 5(c). The definiton of rule is also carefully
expanded to include "the approval or prescription for the future of rates." Id.§ 2(c).
38. Revised Model Act § 9. "The notice shall include . . . a statement of the
time, place, and nature of the hearing . . . a statement of the legal authority andjurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held . . . a reference to the particular
sections of the statutes and rules involved . . . a short and plain statement of
the matters asserted. ... When necessary, the initial notice may consist of a
statement of the issues involved subject to later particularization upon request.
39. The right to cross-examine is provided by the model in id. § 10(3), a sec-
tion devoted to "Rules of Evidence."
40. There would seem only advantage in also providing in id. § 9(c) that:
"Opportunity shall be afforded all parties to respond and present evidence and
argument on all issues involved and to conduct such cross-examination as may
be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."
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of the model contains a novel provision described as of "especial
significance" and "in accordance with the recommendations of
the Hoover Commission Task Force Report."'4' It states that
there shall be included in the record "all staff memoranda or
data submitted to the hearing officer or members of the agency
in connection with their consideration of the case. ' 42 Such a
provision runs quite counter to usual practice and seems only
productive of charges of "secret evidence" based on rumors of
staff memoranda not in the record. The difficulty with the pro-
posed inclusion is that it goes too far and would seem to require
inclusion in the record of any advice given in writing bearing
on the analysis and interpretation of record facts, even though
the data or memoranda may originate with staff expert person-
nel entirely unconnected with the proceeding.43 In federal
agency practice, it is a commonplace for analyses and digests of
facts to be prepared by assistants for the use of deciding officers
without the need for disclosure to the parties.44 The proposal
that such memoranda be included in the record is said by the
Commissioners to rest on the need for preserving the "exclu-
sivity of the record" principle, which is to say, assurance that
the case will not be decided on extra-record facts.45 However,
the proposal would seem to direct the inclusion of all law-clerk
studies devoted to analyzing the record and looking up law,
studies which are not adding extra-record facts at all but simply
making evaluations of the record facts. Reports by a presiding,
but not deciding, officer, based on his observation of a party's
demeanor for resolving issues of credibility, should of course
come within the requirement of inclusion in the record, since
41. The reporter for the Model Act appears to rely upon a recommended provi-
sion in the report to the effect that "no deciding officer . . . shall . . . be . . . ad-
vised by any other agency officer or employee except as a witness or counsel in pub-
lic proceedings of which all parties have notice and in which they have full oppor-
tunity to participate." COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OF THE GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE, REPORT ON LEGAL SOURCES AND PROCEDURE
368 (1955).
42. Revised Model Act § 9(e) (7).
43. The extent to which such a provision would paralyze the administrative
process and isolate the deciding officers from the expert resources of the agency
is extensively developed in 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.16
(1958).
44. The Federal Act provides in § 7(d) that "the transcript of testimony and
exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, shall con-
stitute the exclusive record for decision."
45. See 2 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 11.08, 11.09, 11.10 (1958)
for an extensive analysis of a New Jersey case, Mazza v. Cavicchia, 105 A.2d 545
(1954), which went far to further the idea but which, it is urged, misinterprets
and underestimates federal decisions.
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the report adds new facts to the record. Reports of this kind
from presiding officers are provided for in a later section of the
model, specifying the procedure to be followed where the decid-
ing officials have not heard the evidence or read the record.46
Provision is also made for submission of a proposed decision
to be served on the parties. Seemingly, such a proposed decision,
if reasonably comprehensive, would contain everything neces-
sary for an adverse party to know in order to take meaningful
exceptions.
Rules of Evidence
In the section devoted to rules of evidence, the model pro-
poses two major innovations in agency practice, both of which,
it is believed, are essentially unworkable. First, the model pro-
poses that "irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evi-
dence" be mandatorily excluded. 47 It thus proposes to impose
as a categorical directive on agencies, whose members are often
completely without legal training or experience, a rule of conduct
which experienced trial judges find extremely difficult to adhere
to, even as a matter of policy.48 It would seem that, rather than
impose a requirement which is calculated to strike dismay into
the heart of an experienced trier of fact and which in any event
would doubtless precipitate countless hours of wrangling, it
would have been more discreet to make this provision only pre-
catory. The federal act, for example, simply provides that
"every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclu-
sion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. ' 4
This admonition would seem sufficient, supplemented, as it
should be, by the agency's desire not to complicate its task by
clogging a record unnecessarily.
The second innovation seeks to impose on state agencies, as
a body of law, "the rules of evidence as applied in non-jury
civil cases in the District Courts." ° Inasmuch as researchers
are generally unable to point to such a body of rules as existing
46. Revised Model Act § 11.
47. Id. at § 10(1).
48. While the Oklahoma legislature accepted most of the model act intact, it
here wisely reduced the mandatory "shall" of the model to a permissive "may."
OKLA. STAT. ANN, 75, § 310(1) (1965). The modification is commented upon
favorably by Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, 17 OKL&.
L. REV. 1, 28 (1964).
49. Federal Act § 7(c).
50. Revised Model Act § 10(1).
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in any coherent sense like the exclusionary rules applicable to
jury trials, this would seem to accomplish very little.,' The
model draftsmen would have been better advised to prescribe
the Learned Hand rule that the evidence shall be "convincing
evidence" of the type "on which responsible persons are accus-
tomed to rely in serious affairs." 52 The model resorts to this
latter rule but only "when necessary to ascertain facts not sus-
ceptible of proof under . . . [non-jury] rules."5' 3 It would seem
preferable to adopt the Learned Hand rule as governing; such a
rule will be meaningful to the laymen upon whom we must
often depend to carry on the work of agency adjudication and
will result in about as much uniformity of evidence evaluation
as can be achieved in the administrative process.5 4
The model contains no provision for obtaining evidence by
compulsory process, although it would seem essential that such
process be uniformly available to agencies and affected parties
alike; to serve the convenience of parties and expedite proceed-
ings, provision might also have been made for taking deposi-
tions. 55 The federal act, on the other hand, contains a simply
phrased provision for subpoena power implemented by conven-
tional judicial enforcement.5 6
51. The provision has its origin in Recommendation 42, COMMISSION ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 72 (1955) and in the AMERICAN BAR AssoCIA-
TION, FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE § 1006(d)
(1957). The provision has been described as a "cross reference to meaningless-
ness." 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.04, 270 (1958).
52. NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied
304 U.S. 576 (1938).
53. Revised Model Act § 10(1).
54. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Gov-
ERNMENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 71 (1955). The Commis-
sion on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government urged: "A serious
deficiency in the administrative adjudicatory process is the absence of any uniform
method of evaluating evidence and proof."
55. The Oklahoma legislature expanded the model to include provision for
both subpoena power and the taking of depositions, depositions to be taken "in
the same manner as is provided by law for the taking of depositions in civil actions
in courts of record." OKLA. STAT. ANN. 75, § 315 (1964).
56. Federal Act § 6(c) : "Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be issued
to any party upon request and, as may be required by rules of procedure, upon a
statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence
sought. Upon contest, the court shall sustain any such subpoena or similar process
or demand to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with law and, in any
proceeding for enforcement, shall issue an order requiring the appearance of the
witness or the production of the evidence or data within a reasonable time under
penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply."
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The Decisional Process
The model contains a provision designed to insure that
parties will have an adequate opportunity to prepare exceptions,
briefs, and oral argument in answer to any adverse decision
which is submitted for adoption to agency heads who have not
"heard the case or read the record. ' 57 The comment on this pro-
vision by the Uniform Commissioners states that its purpose is
"to make certain that those persons who are responsible for the
decision shall have mastered the record, either by hearing the
evidence, or reading the record or at the very least receiving
briefs and hearing oral argument." ' It is probably an over-
statement to say that the provision will "make certain" that
the deciding officers have "mastered the record" although it
will presumably insure to some greater extent than without it
that the deciding officers have mastered the issues involved.
What the provision really accomplishes is that there will be ade-
quate notice of positions taken by recommending officers before
submission to deciding officers, so that exceptions and briefs
can be presented when of maximum effectiveness rather than
later, on petition for rehearing.59 In this respect, the model
might well be modified, so as to make it applicable even when the
deciding officers have presided at the taking of evidence but
a recommended decision is prepared by the staff, as is frequently
the case with Public Service Commission orders in Louisiana.60
Final Decisions and Orders
The model provision dealing with the content of a final deci-
sion tries to steer a middle course between "a detailed reciting
of the evidence on the one hand and the bare statement of the
conclusions of fact or the 'ultimate' facts on the other."' It does
57. Revised Model Act § 11.
58. Id. § 11, Commissioners' Note.
59. This was the issue presented in the second Morgan decision, Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938). In the Federal Act, § 8(b) is addressed to
this deficiency by providing that: "Prior to each recommended, initial, or tenta-
tive decision, or decision upon agency review of the decision of subordinate officers
the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit for the considera-
tion of the officers participating in such decisions (1) proposed findings and con-
clusions, or (2) exceptions to the decisions or recommended decisions of sub-
ordinate officers or to tentative agency decisions, and (3) supporting reasons for
such exceptions or proposed findings or conclusions."
60. e.g., Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 14 P.U.R. (3d) 146 (1956).
61. Revised Model Act § 12, Commissioners' Note.
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this by a requirement that each finding of fact, if expressed in
statutory language, "shall be accompanied by a concise and ex-
plicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the find-
ings. ' 62 This seems a laudable objective and one which may
generally be achieved by the directive. Less hope can be enter-
tained for the requirement that "[a] final decision shall include
findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated."3
Such a requirement seems to leave open the question whether
drawing the ultimate statutory fact inference from evidentiary
facts proved is a matter of fact or law. 4 Yet, logical analysis
would characterize this process as fact finding and only the
interpretation of the statutory or ultimate fact standards and
the determination of the requisite elements therein as conclu-
sions of law.6 5 The Wisconsin legislature has substituted its
own language which comes closer to eliminating confusion
by providing:
"Every decision of an agency in a contested case shall be
in writing accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The findings of fact shall consist of a concise and
separate statement of the ultimate conclusions upon each
contested issue of fact without recital of evidence." 66
Rehearings
There is only an elliptical reference to rehearing in the model
judicial review section, but the effect of its inclusion there seems
to make it mandatory for a party to petition for a rehearing
if the agency rules of practice afford one. 67 It is believed that
the preferable practice would be to require the agency to afford
the parties a rehearing if requested but to make it optional with
62. Id. § 12.
63. Ibid.
64. See cases collected in Note, 17 LA. L. REv. 833, 836 (1957) for diverse
judicial treatment of this question.
65. 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TRFATISE § 30.02, at 192, 195 (1958).
66. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.13 (1957). Both the model and Wisconsin provi-
sions might be further strengthened by adopting the federal language to the effect
that "No sanction shall be imposed or order be issued except upon consideration
of the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and
'as supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence." Federal Act § 7 (c). This would also have the virtue, to the writer,
of insulating the agencies from pervasive application of either the exclusionary
rules of evidence used in jury trials or in the "rules of evidence and requirements
of proof as found in civil non-jury cases."
67. Revised Model Act § 15(a) : "A person who has exhausted all administra-
tive remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision
In a contested case is entitled to judicial review. .. ."
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the party whether he will do so prior to seeking judicial review.
Oklahoma has recently dealt with the problem in this way. 8
Separation of Functions
The model proposes a provision proscribing certain ex parte
communications between deciding officers and members of the
staff or parties to the proceeding. This provision, it is believed,
goes too far in cutting off such officers from the advice of
agency experts who have not been engaged in investigating or
prosecuting the case, and it would require a degree of isolation
for deciding officers which could only be achieved at prohibitive
cost for most state agencies.0 9 Thus, the model would cut off
subordinate deciding officers from any expert aid at all, seeking
to place them, presumably, in the situation of a district judge.70
Members of the agency, on the other hand, are permitted to
communicate with other members of the agency and are allowed
the aid of personal assistants.71 Apparently, each member of an
agency may have his own experts, but there may not be a pooi
of experts, not engaged in investigation and prosecution, avail-
68. OKLA. STAT. ANN. 75, § 317(1965) : "A decision in an individual proceed-
ing shall be subject to rehearing, reopening or reconsideration by the agency,
within ten (10) days from the date of its entry. The grounds for such action
shall be either: (a) newly discovered or newly available evidence, relevant to
the issues; (b) need for additional evidence adequately to develop the facts essen-
tial to proper decision; (c) probable error committed by the agency in the pro-
ceeding or in its decision such as would be ground for reversal on judicial review
of the order; (d) need for further consideration of the issues and the evidence
in the public interest; or (e) a showing that issues not previously considered
ought to be examined in order properly to dispose of the matter. The order of
the agency granting rehearing, reconsideration or review, or the petition of a
party therefor, shall set forth the grounds which justify such action. Nothing in
this Section shall prevent rehearing, reopening or reconsideration of a matter by
any agency in accordance with other statutory provisions applicable to such
agency, or, at any time, on the ground of fraud practiced by the prevailing party
or of procurement of the order by perjured testimony or fictitious evidence. On
reconsideration, reopening, or rehearing, the matter may be heard by the agency,
or it may be referred to a hearing examiner. The hearing shall be confined to
those grounds upon which the reconsideration, reopening or rehearing was ordered.
If an application for rehearing shall be timely filed, the period within which ju-
dicial review, under the applicable statute, must be sought, shall run from the
final disposition of such application."
69. Revised Model Act § 13.
70. Ibid.: "Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized
by law, members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to,
make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case shall not com-
municate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, with any
person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with any party or his
representative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate."
71. Ibid.: "An agency member (1) may communicate with other members of
the agency, and (2) may have the aid and advice of one or more personal assist-
ants."
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able to both members of the agency and subordinate deciding
officers to furnish analysis of law and fact incident to prepara-
tion of either a recommended or final decision.
This provision is proposed as necessary "to preclude litigious
facts reaching the deciding minds without getting into the rec-
ord. ' 72 It does not preclude discussions of the law between de-
ciding officers and agency experts, forbidding such discussions
only between the officer and any party or his representative,
except on the record. As to the first objective, it is important
to distinguish between analysis of facts already in the record
and actual additional facts. The threat of injecting new non-
record facts into the mind of the deciding officer comes not from
the expert staff but from office conferences with party appli-
cants, which should be prohibited. On the other hand, expert
analysis of complex factual data already on record should be
available to a deciding officer, so long as it does not come from
the investigative or prosecuting staff and so long as it is analysis
of records facts.73 There seems insufficient reason to cut off a
subordinate deciding officer from the expert resources of the
agency and at the same time provide that deciding agency mem-
bers could have such expert resources on a personal staff basis.
It is believed that communications with any party or his repre-
sentative should be precluded both on issues of fact and law, but
that both the subordinate deciding officer and the agency mem-
bers should have access to the expert resources of the agency
where the experts are not also engaged in the pending case in
an investigative or prosecuting role.74
Licenses
The model contains a provision designed to assure that
licensing will be covered by the procedures prescribed for ad-
judication, wherever the particular form of licensing must be
72. Ibid., Commissioners' Note.
73. See 2 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATisE § 11.10, at 86 (1958).
A chairman of the Federal Communications Commission has testified: "I have
no shame in saying here that I rely . . .upon the expertise of the staff .... I
think it quite important and I do rely, in questions of what the evidence is in a
proceeding of an engineering character, upon the expertise of our chief engineer
or his aides in the Commission." Hearings before thp Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, H.R. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 658, 67, 68 (1951).
74. Of. Federal Act § 5(c). The federal act also contains a provision specifi-
cally imposing impartiality upon deciding officers and providing a method for
recusation in the event it is necessary. Of. Federal Act § 7(a). Of. also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. 75, § 316 (1965).
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preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing. 5 This would
not impose the adjudicative procedures on so-called licensing
for revenue, such as automobile licensing, since no procedural
safeguards are imposed or deemed necessary in such licensing.
In non-revenue licensing, such as liquor licensing, Louisiana
statutes contain adequate safeguard for licensees in the require-
ments of notice and opportunity for hearing preliminary to with-
holding, suspending, or revoking any license,76 but no provision
is made for keeping the license in effect pending appeals except
by the issuance of restraining orders or writs of injunction in-
cident to appeal.7 7 The model proposes a procedure pursuant to
which such a license shall not expire "until the last day for seek-
ing review of the agency order or a later date fixed by order
of the reviewing court.178 Summary suspension of a license may
be ordered, but only on a finding by the agency that "public
health, safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency ac-
tion. ' '79 The model also contains a provision requiring that a
licensee be given notice of facts which may warrant the agency
in taking action with respect to a license and be afforded "an
opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements for
the retention of the license."' 0
Judicial Review: Validity or Applicability of Rules
The model provides for very considerable protection by the
judiciary against the misuse of the rule-making power by an
agency. Thus, an agency which fails to follow the procedure for
adoption of rules may find the validity of the rule "contested."
8
'
No indication of the kind of suit to be brought is given; it is
provided simply that "a proceeding to contest any rule on the
ground of non-compliance with the procedural requirements ...
must be commenced within 2 years from the effective date of
the rule. '8 2 Presumably it is intended, however, that such in-
validity may be contested in a suit for a declaratory judgment,
since the act at a later point provides that "the validity or ap-
plicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declara-
tory judgment in the District Court ... if it is alleged that the
75. Revised Model Act § 14.
76. LA. R.S. 26:96-106 (1950).
77. Id. at 26:106.
78. Revised Model Act § 14(b).
79. Id. § 14(c).
80. Ibid.
81. Id. § 3(c).
82. Ibid.
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rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs,
or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or
privileges of the plaintiff. '8 3 However, the Commissioners' note
points out that, whereas a two-year limit is imposed on the con-
test of a rule's validity because of agency failure to follow pre-
scribed adoption procedure, no such time limitation is imposed
on the bringing of a declaratory judgment to contest validity or
applicability generally.8 4 Furthermore, the model leaves open
the question whether there must be a showing of threatened
injury to a petitioner contesting a procedurally defective rule.
But, if it was intended that there should be such a showing,
then a contest of procedural invalidity would differ only in the
time limitation on bringing the suit, and the provision might
just as well have been included with the general provision of
a declaratory judgment proceeding for testing the validity or
applicability of a rule. Under the federal act, rule-making is
reviewable generally under a provision for review of final ad-
ministrative orders, and no provision is made for the use of a
declaratory judgment proceeding.8 5
The declaratory judgment provision appears well drawn both
in requiring the showing of injury and in including both rights
and privileges. The inclusion of privileges effectively avoids
any argument, particularly in licensing proceedings, that peti-
tioner has only a privilege and hence is not entitled to sue.8
Classification of an interest as one of privilege only has on
occasion resulted in denial of fair procedure to petitioners.87
There is no provision for choice of venue in declaratory judg-
ment proceedings;58 it might be placed either in the parish
where the agency is located or the parish in which the potentially
affected property interest lies. Whether such a choice should
be afforded a party petitioner would turn on whose convenience
should be served. The predominant practice in Louisiana has
been to lay venue in the parish of agency location, a practice
which has resulted on occasion in serious burdening of the
Nineteenth Judicial District judges.8 9 This practice, however,
83. Id. at § 7.
84. Id., Commissioners' Note.
85. Federal Act. § 10.
86. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Davis, 160 So.2d 345, 349-50 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964), commented upon in Symposium, 25 LA. L. REV. 395 (1965).
87. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953).
88. Revised Model Act § 7.
89. E.g., LA. R.S. 45:1192 (1950) : "If any of the persons ... shall be dis-
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has probably also been a factor in the expansion of judicial per-
sonnel in that district, and it may now be that only petitioner's
convenience would be served by affording a choice; the price of
giving such a choice may well be too high if it means diverting
suits from a forum convenient to the agency and with personnel
already sufficient to accomplish the task.
The model also provides a rather involuted process for ob-
taining judicial review of petitions for agency declaratory
rulings by prescribing first that agencies shall provide by rule
for the filing and disposition of such petitions and then that
"rulings disposing of petitions have the same status as agency
decisions or orders in contested cases." 0 In view of the general
lack of success in getting federal agencies to issue declaratory
orders under a simple authorization for such orders,91 the model
approach may be warranted; it subjects to judicial review the
denial as well as the issuance of a declaratory order.
Judicial Review: Agency Adjudication
In adjudicated cases, the requisite for review has been gen-
erally that a person be "aggrieved by a final decision." 92 The
new model, however, imposes a limitation at the outset to the
effect that, in general, "a person who has exhausted all admin-
istrative remedies available within the agency and who is ag-
grieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to
judicial review."93 This seems at least to inject a mandatory
requirement that, where available, petition for rehearing precede
a petition for judicial review, a prescription of doubtful de-
sirability.94 Requirement of a final order subject to exception
where the administrative process can be shown to be inadequate
seems sufficient. Furthermore, injection of the requirement
of exhaustion of "all administrative remedies" seems anomalous
in this paragraph, which also provides for review of interlocu-
tory administrative orders "if review of the final agency deci-
sion would not provide an adequate remedy."95 In this latter
satisfied with any order entered by the commission . . . the dissatisfied person
may ... file in a court at the domicile of the commission, a petition.
90. Revised Model Act § 8.
91. See 1 DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.10, at 276 (1958).
92. This was the approach taken in the 1946 model act, § 12: "Any person
aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, . . . is entitled to judicial
review. .... "
93. Revised Model Act § 15(a).
94. See note 68 supra.
95. Revised Model Act § 15(a).
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connection, it is also to be noted that granting interlocutory
review on the basis of inadequacy of the administrative remedy
alone might result in such review solely on the basis of the
expense of going through with an administrative hearing."" The
greater showing of injury usually exacted in injunction cases,
by imposing the requirement that irreparable injury or the
threat thereof be also demonstrated, provides a deterrent to
frivolous petitions to review interlocutory orders.9 7
The model proposals for scope of review over issues of fact 98
are drawn in part from recommendations of the Hoover Com-
mission Task Force99 and in part from the model act reporters'
own beliefs in the virtues of the "clearly erroneous" rule.100
They seem quite inconsistent and illogical. Thus, the model pro-
vision opens on the bold note that "the court shall not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evi-
dence on questions of fact."''1 Taken at its face value and un-
modified by later statements, such a provision would effectively
seem to rule out any review of facts if there is any evidence to
support a finding, since we may assume that "weighing" facts
means appraising the reliability, probity, and over-all persua-
siveness of the evidence. 2 But, if a court cannot reweigh evi-
dence, it would seem precluded from substituting its judgment
for that of the agency, in assessing the reliability, probity, and
persuasiveness of evidence; and the proposal, as so interpreted,
would go beyond the "substantial evidence" rule, as widely ap-
plied in review of agency decisions. That rule permits a review-
ing court to "weigh" the evidence at least to the point of deter-
96. Cf. Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 304 U.S. 209
(1938).
97. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3601 (1960): "An injunction shall
issue in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to
the applicant. .. ."
98, Revised Model Act § 15(g).
99. Recommendation 44, COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 76
(1955).
100. Cooper, Administrative Law: The Substantial Evidence Rule, 44 A.B.A.J.
945, 946 (1958).
101. Revised Model Act § 15(g).
102. In Jordan v. New Orleans Police Dept., 232 La. 926, 930 95 So.2d 607,
608 (1957), the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that it had "repeatedly stated
that the ruling of the Commission upholding the dismissal of an employee would
not be disturbed where there was some evidence before such body to support its
decision" and that this Court is without authority to examine into the ques-
tion of the weight . . . or the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intoxica-
tion. . . ." But of. Day v. Department of Institutions, 231 La. 775, 93 So.2d 1
(1957).
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mining whether the agency has chosen to accept one of two
fairly conflicting views, each supported by persuasive evi-
dence.10 3 If the agency has so chosen, under this rule, the re-
viewing court may "weigh" no further "even though the court
would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter
been before it de novo."'10 4 If, however, the view chosen by the
agency is not so supported, the court may reverse and may quash
or remand for further proceedings. 10 5
The model draftsmen may, of course, have meant only that
there should be no substitution of judgment in evaluating the
credibility of testimonial evidence. This would be plausible, since
it is the agency which has heard the witnesses, and a proper
deference might thus be paid to the trier of fact who has had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness while
testifying. That this is not what the draftsmen intended becomes
clear as one progresses through the subsection and finds that
"the court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the ad-
ministrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
... (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record. ... 106 In the Com-
missioners' note accompanying this provision, we find the fol-
lowing statements: "The 'substantial evidence rule' [of the 1946
model act] has been replaced by the 'clearly erroneous rule'....
This change places court review of administrative decisions on
fact questions under the same principle as that applied under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in connection with review
of trial court decisions.' 07 The note goes on to state that "this
standard of review does not permit the court to 'weigh' the evi-
dence, or to substitute its judgment on discretionary matters,
but it does permit setting aside 'clearly' erroneous decisions."
And then this peroration is added: "Certainly a clearly errone-
ous decision should not be permitted to stand."'' 0
The last statement is plausible only when used without a
clear understanding of the meaning of the "clearly erroneous"
103. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). "The
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight."
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Revised Model Act § 15(g) and § 15(g) (5).
107. Ibid. Id., Commissioners' note.
108. Ibid.
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rule affecting scope of review on appeal. This rule had its origins
in the change from an equity practice in which trial evidence
was by deposition and review of the trial court de novo, to an
equity practice in which the equity trial judge heard testimony
in open court and the review of trial court findings resulted in
reversal on appeal only if findings were clearly erroneous. When
the Federal Rules were formulated, the equity rule was ap-
parently extended to cover all findings of fact, with only special
deference shown to findings involving the resolution of credi-
bility issues.1 9 Under the rule thus made applicable to all fed-
eral non-jury cases, a reviewing court felt free to upset findings
of fact if convinced that there was "clear error" in the finding,
a term widely accepted as meaning such error as left the re-
viewing court "with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." 0 A reviewing court was free
under the rule to substitute its own judgment over findings
of evidentiary or primary facts, after giving "due regard ... to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of
the witnesses.""' It also felt free, as under the de novo review
practice in equity, to substitute its own judgment over the find-
ings of ultimate fact inferred from the evidentiary or primary
fact, if convinced of clear error, which is to say that it would
independently conclude whether it found the ultimate fact find-
ing of the trial court or its own possibly opposite ultimate fact
finding persuasive." 2 "Clearly erroneous" may thus mean no
more than that of two conflicting findings of ultimate fact, each
supported by persuasive evidence, the reviewing court concludes
that the finding not made by the trial judge is more persuasive.
In this frame of reference, there is considerably less force to
the Commissioners' comment that "certainly a clearly erroneous
decision should not be permitted to stand." It may be that such
a decision should stand, where made by an administrative
agency, if it was the legislative intent that findings of ultimate
fact should be made by an agency with specific expertness in
the subject matter involved and that the finding of ultimate fact
of the expert is persuasively supported.
109. Authorities on the history of the rule are collected in Comment, 21
LA. L. REv. 402, 419 (1961).
110. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
111. FED. R. CIV. PROc. rule 52(a) (1963).
112. E.g., Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) and see
cases collected in Note, 17 LA. L. REv. 833, 836, n.20 (1957).
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This, of course, is what is accomplished by the "substantial
evidence" rule, as adopted by many states and by the federal
government in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.113
Its genesis is not from equity practice but from the jury trial
practice; and while it had its early development in the review
of National Labor Board cases under the Wagner Act,1 4 it was
adopted as the standard for all agency review by the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. It was perhaps most
helpfully described in application by the Supreme Court in an
early Labor Board case as requiring on review that "the find-
ings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive .... [T] his . . .means evidence which is substan-
tial, that is affording a substantial basis of fact from which
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . .Substantial
evidence ... means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion ... and it must
be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to
direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from
it is one of fact for the jury."' 15 A few years later, in another
Labor Board case, the Supreme Court noted that "if the findings
of the Board are supported by evidence the courts are not free
to set them aside, even though the Board could have drawn dif-
ferent inferences."1 6 Still later, and after the adoption of the
"substantial evidence on the whole record" rule in the Taft-
Hartley and Federal Administrative Procedure Acts, it said of
the rule: "Nor does it mean that even as to matters not requiring
expertise a court may displace the Board's choice between two
fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably
have made a different choice had the matter been before it
de novo."'"
1 7
Thus, under the substantial evidence rule, the reviewing
court must, as a practical necessity, reweigh the evidence to
determine whether or not the evidence has sufficient weight
to compel reasonable men to reach the same conclusion as the
agency, or sufficient weight for reasonable men to differ among
themselves in the conclusion. But once the court decides that
the evidence has sufficient weight to meet either of these con-
113. Federal Act § 10(e).
114. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-97 (1951).
115. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
116. NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 107 (1942).
117. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ditions, the court, under the substantial evidence rule, may weigh
no further. Within the area wherein reasonable men may differ
among themselves, the agency's conclusion, made upon what the
agency finds to be the weight or preponderance of the evidence,
is final. The agency's determination of credibility issues should
be final; or, at the very least, great deference should be given
to the opportunity of the agency to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. There would seem little basis for the adoption,
for state agency practice, of the federal rule that disagreement
between a deciding officer and the agency head of an issue of
credibility should in turn open up the credibility issue to a re-
viewing court.118
Admittedly, there is a great deal of flexibility in the sub-
stantial evidence concept; it seems clear, however, that the
reviewing court is precluded from disturbing findings of fact
in a much greater number of cases than under the broader
formation of the clearly erroneous rule. It is submitted that
this is as it should be, where the legislature has by the very
creation of an agency with fact finding power given indication
that it wanted special competence brought to bear in certain
social and economic areas.
The arguments for the more broadly drawn "clearly erro-
neous" rule, as presented by the reporter for the model act, are,
in the main, that the federal circuit courts of appeal, or many
of them, have ignored the limitations of the "substantial evi-
dence" rule when they have wanted to substitute their judg-
ment for the agency's. An impressive array of cases is mar-
shalled in which this may well be true.1 9 In addition, a number
of federal circuit courts of appeal have chosen to regard find-
ings of ultimate fact as questions of law and hence open to the
court for substitution of judgment.20 Thus, it is argued, the
path of reason leads to the abandonment of the limiting rule and
the adoption of the broader rule under which this is legally per-
missible. Rather than abandon the effort, however, if it is an
118. The United States Supreme Court has so held, although the language is
obscure: ". . . evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an
impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with
the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he has
reached the same conclusion." Id. at 496.
119. Cooper, Administrative Law: The Substantial Evidence Rule, 44 A.B.A.J.
945, 949 (1958).
120. See cases collected in Note, 17 LA. L. Ray. 833, 836, n.20 (1957).
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objective which is implicit in the creation of administrative
agencies by the legislature, it seems more reasonable to adopt
the substantial evidence rule as governing appellate review of
agency findings of fact and make sure that the legislative mean-
ing of the rule is available to the reviewing courts. Then, if it is
flouted, the matter will be between the legislature and the
courts.12
1
121. Section 15(g) of the model could be modified so as to achieve the fore-
going objectives by modifying the first sentence of the subsection to read: "The
court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of primary or ultimate fact except in accordance with
the substantial evidence rule." Subsection 15(g) (5) could then be modified so as
to read, in conjunction with the opening statement: "The court may reverse or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: . . .
unsupported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole rec-
ord; . . . ." An explanatory comment on the meaning of the substantial evidence
rule could be included at this point, or, better perhaps, could be included in the
definitional section at the beginning of the act.
